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UKRAINE: ANALYZING THE REVOLUTION AND NATO
ACTION IN LIGHT OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND NICARAGUA
ABSTRACT
Ukraine has been in a precarious position since its independence in 1991.
It has been in the midst of an identity crisis. The eastern part of the country is
partial to Russia, while the western half of the country prefers to be politically
aligned with Europe. Since 2014, Ukraine has been wrought with a political
coup, civil unrest in the Donbass region, and subject to Russian aggression.
The current Ukrainian government established in wake of the coup is
attempting to quell the uprisings from dissenters and Russian forces in the
eastern part of the country, and NATO has diplomatically supported the
current Ukrainian government. However, Ukraine is not a member of NATO,
thus the country cannot avail itself of collective defense as set out in Article 5
of the NATO Treaty. This Comment argues that any assistance from NATO
countries to the current Ukrainian government would violate the International
Court of Justice’s decision in Nicaragua v. United States because the current
government is illegitimate.
INTRODUCTION
Ukraine is in the midst of a tug of war and has been since 1991. European
influence pulls the country in one direction, while Russian influence pulls it in
the opposite direction. Throughout 2014, Ukraine was divided by political
revolution and was placed under political and military pressure by Russia.
Russia has annexed the Crimean peninsula and there is some evidence that it
has fomented rebellion in eastern Ukraine.1 These events have resulted in the
highest tensions between Russia and the West since the height of the Cold
War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), one of the most
formidable collective defense organizations in the world, has held special
sessions addressing Ukraine, fearful of Russia’s advancing and escalating
aggression toward NATO members, and the United States has decided to place
embargos on Russia.2

1

See infra Part II.
See, e.g., Doug Schoen, New U.S. Sanctions on Russia Go Further Than Ever Before, FORBES (July 17,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/2014/07/17/new-us-sanctions-against-russia-go-further-than-ever2
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Furthermore, the United States and other NATO members have supplied
Ukraine with weapons in an effort to thwart Russia’s advances.3 Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty permits NATO to engage in collective military
defense on behalf of its members, but since Ukraine is not a member, NATO
may not intervene militarily on behalf of the country.4 Ukraine is already
internally divided as a result of former President Viktor Yanukovych’s ouster
and the subsequent establishment of a new governmental regime.5
Additionally, Russia’s incursions and annexation of Ukrainian territory marked
the first time since World War II that a country has invaded sovereign territory
in Eastern Europe.6 NATO allies are fearful that Russian aggression will
ultimately divide the Ukrainian state, resulting in a revival of Cold War
tensions. NATO is hesitant to sit on its hands as Russia encroaches on its
members, and it will look to support Ukraine as best it can. The world is
watching NATO and Russia, as it is the next great geopolitical chess game to
invoke the legal limits of a collective defense organization’s resort to force.
This is the situational crisis the West never hoped to see.
Prior to examining the legal ramifications of this crisis, it is imperative to
set the historical and political stage. To approach the current Ukrainian crisis,
Ukraine-Russian relations, and the interplay of NATO action, Part I of this
Comment begins with a historical analysis of Ukraine and its connection to
Russia. In order to fully understand where we are and where we are going, we
must understand how we got here. While that expression is somewhat cliché, it
exhibits unwavering truth. Part II of this Comment provides a brief historical
analysis that will elucidate why Russians feel so strongly about Ukraine and
portrays how the events that unfolded over the past several years are symptoms
of deeper historical tensions between the two countries. After examining
Ukraine’s historical inception, this Comment analyzes the events that unfolded
in Ukraine over the final months of 2013 and all of 2014.
Part III of this Comment examines what NATO countries may do to defend
a non-NATO country, especially when its fall is of crucial consequence to
before/; see also NATO Summit to Highlight Unity Against Russia, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/09/nato-summit-highlight-unity-against-russia-20149445948732370.html.
3 NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-29198497.
4 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
5 See infra Part II.A.
6 Will Englund, Kremlin Says Crimea Is Now Officially Part of Russia After Treaty Signing, Putin
Speech, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-putin-prepares-to-annexcrimea/2014/03/18/933183b2-654e-45ce-920e-4d18c0ffec73_story.html.
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nearby NATO countries. In other words, how much may NATO intervene on
behalf of a non-NATO country? Part IV of this Comment examines the various
legal issues involved in this crisis. It first examines the justifications for the use
of force and then analyzes NATO’s actions and purported justifications with
respect to the use of force in Kosovo in 1999. It then examines whether the
new Ukrainian government, established in the wake of the 2014 revolution, is
legitimate.
The question of legitimacy has profound implications for whether NATO
countries may provide the current Ukrainian government with weapons to
secure its power and legitimacy over the eastern part of the country.7 If the
government is not legitimate, then the United States and other NATO
countries, in the contribution of arms and training of soldiers to and for the
current Ukrainian government, would be in violation of the International Court
of Justice’s (ICJ) decision in Nicaragua v. United States.8 Part V of this
Comment examines whether eastern Ukraine is being denied the right of selfdetermination and can thus engage in external self-determination to unite with
Russia, a country with which it has closer ethnic, cultural, and political ties.
As a general proposition, Nicaragua stipulates that it is illegal for a state to
intervene on behalf of a rebel group for the purpose of overthrowing a
legitimate state government unless it is a war of national liberation.9 A war of
national liberation is generally seen as legitimate because it is closely
connected to the right of self-determination.10 In terms of Ukraine, the issue is
whether the United States and other NATO countries may be violating
Nicaragua by intervening on behalf of a government that is not legitimate. The
current Ukrainian government is not what one would usually think of as rebels,
but it was placed into power as a result of a revolution. Western Ukrainians
vehemently rebelled against the prior government’s political decisions, and the
protests quickly developed into revolution and ouster of the President.11 There
was an immediate change of power with little regard for due process, and there
7 See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits,
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
8 See id. ¶¶ 239–45 (explaining that the United States intended to overthrow the government of
Nicaragua by way of supporting and assisting rebels whose purpose was to overthrow its government, which
amounts to an intervention that constitutes a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention firmly rooted in
international law).
9 See id.; see also PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
336 (Routledge, 7th ed. 1997).
10 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶¶ 239–45.
11 See infra Part II.A.
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was little justification for a revolution of such scale.12 The current government
is trying to take control over the entirety of the country, mainly through
suppressing dissenters in eastern Ukraine.13 Although the current government
is already in power and NATO did not assist in overthrowing the prior regime,
NATO is attempting to help assert and establish the current government’s
legitimacy. In short, the West wants this current government in power for
political reasons and weapons are being given to suppress the protesters in
eastern Ukraine.
I. HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE
A. Historical Development of Ukraine
The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared Ukraine to be independent from
the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991, by a vote of 346 to one.14 The
Declaration of Independence of Ukraine was put to a referendum a few months
later and received overwhelming support.15 Later that same month, the Soviet
Union officially dissolved, and Ukraine became an independent state.16
Previously, Ukraine had asserted independence during the Ukrainian
Revolution in 1917,17 but that was short-lived because the country was
overtaken by the Soviet Union in 1920.18
The Treaty of Riga, formalized in March 1921, officially established the
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (“Uk SSR”),19 but also conceded much of
current day western Ukraine (western Volhynia) to Poland.20 During World
War II, Soviet forces invaded Poland and annexed western Ukraine in an
attempt to reunify the Soviet satellite country.21 After World War II, the Soviet
12

See infra Part IV.D.
See infra Part II.D.
14 PAUL KUBICEK, THE HISTORY OF UKRAINE 136 (2008).
15 SERHY YEKELCHYK, UKRAINE: BIRTH OF A MODERN NATION 191 (2007). The Declaration was put to a
referendum on December 1, 1991, and of the 84.2% that voted, 90.3% voted in favor of independence. Id.
16 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 138.
17 YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 67–68 (explaining that the collapse of the Russian and AustroHungarian empires and the political events culminating after World War I created an opportunity for Ukrainian
Nationalists to establish Ukraine as a nation).
18 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 90 (explaining that the Bolsheviks, in conjunction with Russian support,
took over much of Ukraine and established Russian rule); see also YEKELCHYK, supra note 14, at 83
(explaining the collapse of the short lived independent Ukraine in 1920).
19 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 98.
20 YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 83.
21 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 107.
13
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Union seized more land from Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, and
annexed it to the Uk SSR.22 From the independence movement that unfolded in
1991, it is evident the idea of an independent Ukraine was never extinct, but
only dormant.
B. Cultural Underpinnings of Ukraine
Russia has always had an interest in and felt a strong connection to
Ukraine. Russian tsars viewed Ukraine as subordinate to Russian rule to such
an extent that they often referred to Ukrainians as “Little Russians.”23 Much of
Russia’s fondness for Ukraine stems from both historical notions24 and the fact
that they are closely related culturally and linguistically.25 Additionally, eastern
Ukraine has abundant resources for the steel and agriculture industries,26
providing an economic incentive for Russia to seize control of the country.
Ukraine is a diverse country, with over one hundred different national or ethnic
groups.27 Ethnic Ukrainians make up approximately 78.8% of the population,
but there is a sizeable minority of 17.3% ethnic Russians.28 Furthermore, while
the official language of the country is Ukrainian, with 67.5% claiming it as
their native language, nearly thirty percent of the population claims Russian as
their native language.29 As a result of their common heritage, history, and
proximity, the political affairs of Ukraine are inevitably intertwined with
Russian interests.
Eastern Ukraine contains more ethnic Russians and therefore has a more
pro-Russian or Eastern sentiment.30 Western Ukraine is more interested in
22

Id. at 111.
Id. at 45.
24 Theunis Bates, Ukraine’s Fraught Relationship With Russia: A Brief History, WEEK (Mar. 8, 2014),
http://theweek.com/article/index/257616/ukraines-fraught-relationship-with-russia-a-brief-history (explaining that
both Russia and Ukraine trace their roots back to the founding of the first eastern Slavic state, the Kievan Rus,
which existed from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries); see also KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 27–29
(examining the various Russian and Ukrainian claims to the heritage of the Kievan Rus and how these
different claims led to the ideas of Russians seeing Ukraine as theirs and Ukrainians seeing themselves as
having an independent ethnic identity, separate from that of Russians).
25 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 45.
26 Ed Dolan, Ukraine’s Heavy Industry: Glittering Prize or White Elephant?, ECONOMONITOR: ED
DOLAN’S ECON BLOG (May 5, 2014), http://www.economonitor.com/dolanecon/2014/05/05/ukraines-heavy-industryglittering-prize-or-white-elephant/.
27 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 4.
28 The World Factbook: Ukraine, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html (last updated June 23, 2014).
29 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 5.
30 Id. at 8.
23
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Westernization and favors closer ties to the European Union (EU), NATO, and
the United States.31 Furthermore, the percentage of Ukrainians who identify
Russian as their primary language is starkly more dramatic in the eastern part
of the country when compared to the western part of the country.32 The eastern
provinces of Ukraine have a much higher percentage of people who identify
Russian as their primary language as compared to the western part of the
country.33 For example in the eastern provinces, the numbers are often in the
upper sixtieth and seventieth percentiles, while the numbers in most of the
western provinces fall well below ten percent.34 This divide results in the
country having certain political alliances based upon ethnicity.
C. Political Developments in Ukraine
In November 2004, Viktor Yanukovych ran for President against Viktor
Yuschenko in a run-off election.35 Exit polls indicated that Yuschenko had a
sizeable lead on Yanukovych, and he was expected to win the election.36
However, the election results showed that Yanukovych had won the majority
of the votes.37 Ukrainians began accusing Yanukovych of election fraud.38
Polls in Donetsk, an eastern district of Ukraine, reported one hundred percent
voter turnout, and was just one of the many districts that had inflated turnout
rates.39 More interestingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated
Yanukovych on his victory two days before the election results were
released.40
Thousands of Ukrainians began to rally in Independence Square (“the
Maidan”) to protest the fraudulent election results.41 In December 2004, the
Ukrainian Supreme Court demanded a recount, and in January 2005, the

31

Id.
See Amy Mantravadi, The Ukraine Crisis Explained in a Series of Maps, CHURCH & STATE (Mar. 6,
2014), http://amymantravadi.com/2014/03/06/ukraine-crisis-explained-series-maps/.
33 See id.
34 Id.
35 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 169.
36 Id.
37 YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 216. Yanukovych had 49.5% of the vote while Yuschenko had 46.9%.
Id.
38 Id. at 217 (explaining that Yuschenko and his election advisors had evidence of phone calls made and
received by Yanukovych’s election advisors revealing election fraud).
39 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 169.
40 Id. at 170.
41 YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 217.
32
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Central Electoral Commission declared Yuschenko the victor.42 This would
later become known as the Orange Revolution.43 It seemed to have tainted
Yanukovych’s political career in Ukraine, but there was another election
opportunity in 2010.
Given the historical development and cultural underpinnings of Ukraine,
the presidential election in 2010 was a pivotal point in the country’s history
and set the stage for the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. In February 2010, Viktor
Yanukovych was elected the President of Ukraine, winning 48.95% of the
vote.44 Yanukovych’s victory was surprising, given his former history of
suppressing the democratic process in Ukraine. Yanukovych was widely
despised in western Ukraine, but had strong support in his native Russianspeaking eastern and southern Ukraine.45 His presidential platform garnished
strong support from those parts of the country because they favor closer
political ties with Russia.46 The 2010 election portrayed Ukraine’s ethnic
regional divide in political terms and only reaffirmed the notion that the
country has a split political identity.47 The majority of Yanukovych’s backers
were from eastern Ukraine.48 The election of Yanukovych, and more
specifically, his political favor toward Russia, was a major catalyst that
ostensibly led to the Ukrainian revolution in 2014.

42

KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 173.
YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 216.
44 Final Tally Shows Yanukovich Wins Ukraine Election, CNN (Feb. 10, 2010, 6:22 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/02/10/ukraine.elections/ (explaining that Yanukovych defeated incumbent Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko).
45 Vladimir Isachenkov & Maria Danilova, Roots and Consequence of Ukraine’s Violence, ASSOCIATED
PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Feb. 20, 2014, 3:58 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/roots-and-consequences-ukrainesviolence.
46 Olexiy Haran & Dmytro Prokopchuk, The Drama of Ukraine’s 2010 Presidential Election, PONARS
EURASIA POL’Y MEMO NO. 89, at 1, 4 (Univ. of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Mar. 2010), https://www.gwu.edu/
~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_089.pdf (“Yanukovych’s presidential campaign team settled on slogans from the
2004 election as still the best ones for mobilizing their regional electorate: anti-NATO sentiment, promises to
make Russian the second official state language, and insistence on the absence of a falsified vote in 2004.”).
47 See Max Fisher, Ukraine’s Protests Are Back. Here’s Why, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/21/ukraines-protests-are-back-heres-why/.
48 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 171.
43
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II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE 2014 UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION
A. Stepping Toward Russia and Political Rejection
The Ukrainian revolution, which was primarily fueled by matters of
political difference, led to the ouster of President Yanukovych, and also made
Ukraine vulnerable to rebellion in the eastern part of the country. In November
2013, Yanukovych suspended talks to form a trade deal with the European
Union.49 The suspension came in the wake of strong pressure from Russia not
to sign the deal.50 Yanukovych later accepted an economic deal with Russia.51
Later that same month, Ukrainian unrest, mainly in the western region of the
country, began as a response to the rejection of the deal.52 In addition,
Ukrainians were also calling for a restoration of Ukraine’s 2004 Constitution
because of Yanukovych’s efforts to strengthen his power.53 The protestors saw
Yanukovych’s actions as contrary to national interests, submissive toward
Russian interests, and demanded that he change his decision.54 Thousands of
Ukrainians occupied the Maidan in central Kiev for peaceful protest.55 Western
Ukrainians were eager to integrate Ukraine with Europe and they viewed
Yanukovych’s actions as contrary to the overarching goal of moving closer to
Europe.56 The rallies were peaceful, but violence quickly erupted in January
after the Parliament passed restrictive laws in order to quell the protests.57
On February 20, 2014, seventy-seven people were killed in the Maidan
over a two-day period as fighting broke out between the protestors and
police.58 As a result of the violence and Yanukovych’s political decisions,
protestors eventually demanded for Yanukovych’s resignation from the

49 Ukraine Suspends Preparations for EU Trade Agreement, BBC NEWS: EUR. (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25032275.
50 Id. Russia, as alluded to previously, has been motivated to draw Ukraine closer politically and
culturally, away from Westernization. See supra Part I.B.
51 Fisher, supra note 47. Russia offered Ukraine an economic stimulus of $15 billion and a thirty-three
percent discount on Russian gas. Id.
52 Isachenkov & Danilova, supra note 45.
53 Paul D. Shinkman, Ukrainian Government Signs Peace Deal, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014, 4:27 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/02/21/ukrainian-government-signs-peace-deal. The restoration of the
2004 Constitution would have shifted powers from the President to the Parliament. Id.
54 See Isachenkov & Danilova, supra note 45.
55 Why is Ukraine in Turmoil?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe25182823.
56 See id.
57 Isachenkov & Danilova, supra note 45.
58 Why is Ukraine in Turmoil?, supra note 55.
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presidency.59 On February 22nd, the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada)60
voted to dismiss Yanukovych from office.61 Of the 450 Ukrainian lawmakers,
328 voted to remove Yanukovych from the presidency on the basis that he had
abandoned his office and the fact that more than eighty protestors died in the
Maidan.62 Yanukovych later appeared on television in an interview saying, “I
am not planning to leave the country. I am the legitimate president, and I am
not going to resign.”63 Yanukovych had fled the country prior to when the vote
was taken, and claimed that he was forced to leave due to a threat on his life.64
The Verkhovna Rada next voted to free Ukraine’s former Prime Minister,
Yulia Tymoshenko, from prison.65 At a speech in the Maidan, she referred to
the former government as “a cancer.”66 Olexander Turchynov was appointed
interim President of Ukraine.67
The interim government, believing it had acted pursuant to constitutional
authority, held a new election in May 2014 for the purpose of moving the
country forward.68 Petro Poroshenko won that election with more than fiftyfive percent of the popular vote.69 Most importantly, the revolution in western
Ukraine created an equal and opposite reaction in eastern Ukraine.70 Those in

59

Isachenkov & Danilova, supra note 45.
KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 10.
61 William Booth, Ukraine’s Parliament Votes to Oust President; Former Prime Minister is Freed from
Prison, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraines-yanukovych-missingas-protesters-take-control-of-presidential-residence-in-kiev/2014/02/22/802f7c6c-9bd2-11e3-ad71e03637a299c0_story.html.
62 Daisy Sindelar, Was Yanukovych’s Ouster Constitutional?, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Feb.
23, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/was-yanukovychs-ouster-constitutional/25274346.html.
63 Booth, supra note 61. Yanukovych called the oppositional members of Parliament “bandits” and
referred to their actions as “illegal.” Id.
64 Don Mackay & Nick Sommerlad, Russia Invades Crimea to ‘protect its Black Sea naval fleet’ as
Ukraine Tensions Soar, MIRROR (Feb. 28, 2014, 9:13 PM), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/
ukraine-news-russia-invades-crimea-3194129.
65 Booth, supra note 61.
66 Id.
67 Harriet Salem, Who Exactly is Governing Ukraine?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/who-governing-ukraine-olexander-turchynov.
68 Eric Herron, Is Ukraine Ready to Vote?, WASH. POST (May 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/18/is-ukraine-ready-to-vote/.
69 Petro Poroshenko Claims Ukraine Presidency, BBC NEWS (May 25, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-27569057.
70 Tom Kutsch, Ukrainians in the South and East Oppose Pro-Western Leadership, AL JAZEERA AM.
(Feb. 27, 2014, 10:03 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/27/in-ukraine-s-eastdivision
notdissolution.html.
60

EMERY GALLEYSPROOFS2

442

2/24/2016 11:25 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

eastern Ukraine viewed western Ukraine as not having their interest at heart in
the decision to oust the former President.71
B. Russia Closes in on Crimea
The protests in western Ukraine were wrought with tension and caused
rallies among pro-Russian supporters in eastern Ukraine.72 The rallies were
especially strong in eastern Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, where there is a
strong Russian heritage and connection.73 Soon after the interim government
was appointed, a group of pro-Russian activists seized government buildings in
Crimea and raised a Russian flag to challenge the ousting of Yanukovych.74
The Ukrainian government suspected the pro-Russian activists were being
supported by Russia in an effort to “undermin[e] national sovereignty.”75
Russia escalated tensions in Ukraine by invading Crimea.76
During this invasive measure, Russian troops seized control over the
international airport in the Crimean capital.77 In March 2014, the Kremlin
officially announced that Crimea had been annexed to Russia.78 The
announcement was monumental because it marked the first time since World
War II that a European country seized land from another.79 The United States
condemned Russia’s act of aggression with President Barack Obama saying
“[t]hat is not how international law is supposed to operate.”80 Russia’s invasion
and annexation of Crimea, while important to understanding the Ukrainian
71

See id.
Id. (noting that the protests were inspired by the ousting of Yanukovych and imposition of the new
pro-western government).
73 See Howard Amos, Ukraine Crisis Fuels Secession Calls in Pro-Russian South, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23,
2014, 2:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/ukraine-crisis-secession-russian-crimea. In a
rally in the Sevastopol in Crimea, there were talks of secession and pledges of allegiance to Russia. The
Crimean peninsula had previously been a part of Russia for sixty years. Id.
74 Ukraine Appoints New PM as Armed Men Seize Govt Buildings in Crimea, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 27,
2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/27/armed-men-seize-governmentbuildingsincrimea.html.
75 Mark Adomanis, Did Russia Just Invade Crimea?, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2014, 8:04 AM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2014/02/28/did-russia-just-invade-crimea/ (internal quotations omitted).
76 Mackay & Sommerlad, supra note 64 (“Moscow insisted its soldiers were on a mission to ‘protect
Black Sea Fleet’s positions.’”).
77 Id.
78 Englund, supra note 6. President Putin put forth a couple of justifications for the annexation of
Crimea. One was to protect Russians in eastern Ukraine from abuse by Ukrainian nationalists and the other
was to assure that the Black Sea Naval Base stayed in Russian territory in the event that Ukraine joined
NATO. Id.
79 Id.
80 Ukraine Crisis: US Condemns Russian ‘aggression,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-26441698.
72
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crisis, is not a central aspect of this Comment. It is a well-established principle
of customary international law that the taking of territory through force or
threat of force is a violation of international law.81 The annexation of Crimea
was important, however, because it foreshadowed that Russia was willing to
extend its reach further into eastern Ukraine.
C. Russia Eyes Eastern Ukraine
In early March 2014, the Russian Parliament approved President Putin’s
request to potentially use force in Ukraine to protect Russian interests.82 Later
that month, President Obama suggested that Russia “move back its troops”
located near the eastern Ukrainian border in order to ease tensions.83 Russia
sent troops near the eastern Ukrainian border to protect the pro-Russian
separatists, who had taken control of government buildings in the Donetsk
region.84 On April 7th, the separatists once again seized control of government
buildings in the Donetsk region with the intention of passing a referendum of
independence from Ukraine.85 The referendum was successful and Moscow
recognized the results, but western Ukraine denounced the results as
fraudulent.86
As the riots and protests in the eastern side of the country escalated,
Ukraine’s then acting President Olexander Turchynov instituted an “anti-terror
operation.”87 The operation was unsuccessful, however, as pro-Russian
81 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.”); id. ¶ 6 (applying this principle to states that are not members of the United
Nations); see also Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796; Elihu Root, The
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations Adopted by the American Institute of International Law, 10
AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 212–13 (1916) (“Every nation has the right to exist, and to protect and to conserve its
existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve
its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states.”).
82 Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275 (last
updated Nov. 13, 2014).
83 Id.
84 Charlie D’Agata, Ukrainian City of Donetsk Epitomizes Country’s Crisis, CBS NEWS (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukrainian-city-of-donetsk-epitomizes-countrys-crisis/.
85 Pro-Russian Protesters Seize Gov’t Buildings in Ukraine’s Donetsk, Lugansk and Kharkov, RT
(Apr. 7, 2014), http://rt.com/news/ukraine-donetsk-protest-russia-733/.
86 Ukraine Crisis: Will the Donetsk Referendum Matter?, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2014), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-27344412. Kiev responded by calling the referendum a violation of international law
and said the voting standards were not transparent, containing massive irregularities. Id.
87 Ukraine Says Donetsk ‘anti-terror operation’ Under Way, BBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-27035196. The aim of the operation was to protect “Ukrainian citizens, to stop
the terror, to stop the crime, to stop the attempts to tear our country apart.” Id.
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militants seized six of the armored vehicles sent to stop the terror in the
region.88 Amidst the violence and escalating tensions, an agreement was made
between Russia, Ukraine, the United States and the European Union to deescalate the crisis.89 As part of the agreement, illegitimate military groups in
Ukraine were to disband, government buildings seized by the protestors were
to be vacated, and the pro-Russian separatists were to be granted amnesty.90
The agreement did not come to fruition, however, because the Russian
separatists refused to vacate the government buildings.91
D. A Long, Hot Summer
In mid-May 2014, NATO announced that there was no evidence that
Russia had withdrawn any of their troops from the eastern border of Ukraine.92
For much of the summer months, violent clashes between the Ukrainian
government and Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine remained the norm.93
By June 2014, the United Nations (U.N.) estimated that over 400 people had
been killed in the hostile territory.94 In June, the rebels agreed to a ceasefire,
but it was short-lived, as the rebels made it clear they had no intention of
surrendering.95
In late June, key developments garnered international attention. First,
President Putin delayed a resolution in Parliament that would have authorized
Russia to use military force in Ukraine.96 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry

88 Ukraine Crisis: Military Column ‘seized’ in Kramatorsk, BBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-27053500.
89 Ukraine Crisis: Deal to ‘de-escalate’ Agreed in Geneva, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-27072351 (last updated Apr. 16, 2014).
90 Id.
91 Ukraine’s Geneva Agreement Falters, EURACTIV (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/
global-europe/ukraines-geneva-agreement-falters-301668.
92 Ukraine Crisis: No Sign of Russia Withdrawal, Says NATO, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27476172. It was estimated there were approximately 40,000 troops
near the border, and NATO announced, contrary to Russia’s assertion, that there was no evidence that the
troops have withdrawn—a serious move that would de-escalate the crisis. Id.
93 See Ukraine Crisis: Donetsk Sees Deadliest Attack on Troops, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27515514. Pro-Russian separatists killed fourteen people when they
shot down a military helicopter and took control of two military bases in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine Crisis:
Timeline, supra note 82.
94 Ukraine Fighting: West Warns Russia of Sanctions, BBC NEWS (June 25, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-28011179.
95 David Herszenhorn, Ukrainian President Ends Cease-Fire With Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/world/europe/ukrainian-president-ends-cease-fire-with-rebels.html.
96 Ukraine Fighting: West Warns Russia of Sanctions, supra note 94.
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was pleased by the decision but called on Russia to take more action to stop the
transfer of arms to separatists in the region.97 The United States deemed
Putin’s decision to delay the resolution a step in the right direction to deescalate the crisis. Second, in a zealous attempt to become more allied with the
West, Ukraine, among other countries, signed a partnership agreement with the
European Union.98 The signing of the partnership agreement was a blow to
Russia, which was worried about the extending sphere of Western influence
and the impending economic repercussions of having Ukraine favoring
Western products.99 President Poroshenko described that day as the most
important in Ukraine’s history since it received its independence in 1991.100
On July 17, 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down over the
region, killing 298 people.101 There were reports that the plane was shot down
by pro-Russian rebels.102 Eyewitnesses said they had seen rebels with a BUK
missile launcher not far from where the plane was shot down.103 In fact, one of
the eyewitnesses claimed the accents and mannerisms of the individuals with
the missile launcher were much more like that of Russian soldiers than
Ukrainian rebels.104 This event grabbed the world’s attention and only
furthered speculation that Russia was supporting and supplying the rebellion.
The United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on Russia’s
energy, banking, and defense industries as a result.105 In reaction to the
imposed sanctions from the West, Putin counter-measured by implementing a
full embargo against the United States and the European Union on fruit,
vegetables, and dairy products.106

97

Id.
EU Signs Pacts with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-28052645.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 MH17 Crash: Dutch Experts Say Numerous Objects Hit the Plane, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29119024.
102 Id.
103 John Sweeney, MH17 Disaster: Russians ‘controlled BUK missile system,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 8,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29109398.
104 Id.
105 Justyna Pawlak & Eric Beech, EU and U.S. Announce New Sanctions on Russia over Ukraine,
REUTERS (July 29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/29/us-ukraine-crisis-east-idUSKBN0
FY0OX20140729.
106 Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, supra note 82.
98
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E. Russia Invades Ukraine and NATO Responds
Russia invaded Ukraine in August 2014. After the invasion, there was a
swarming dialogue of culpability between Russia, Ukraine, and the United
States.107 Many countries officially condemned the invasion, and much of the
world’s leaders were skeptical of Russia’s assertions that it was not sending
troops to fight alongside the rebels.108 Prior to the August invasion, multiple
reports surfaced that three Russian tanks invaded Ukraine in June.109 On
August 28th, the Russian Presidential Human Rights Council reported that one
hundred Russians were killed in the Donetsk province on August 13th while
they were driving an ammunition truck.110 Both of these reports confirmed the
world’s suspicions that Russia was operating in Ukraine. On August 22nd,
NATO announced that the Russian military moved artillery units manned by
Russian soldiers onto Ukrainian soil.111 Furthermore, Ukraine’s army released
a statement indicating that “up to 100” Russian tanks, army vehicles, and
rocket launchers were seen traveling in eastern Ukraine.112
In another invasive measure, Russia sent five “armored personnel carriers”
to Ukraine in support of the pro-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and
Luhansk provinces.113 A Ukrainian officer labeled the incursion as a “full-scale
invasion” and a U.S. official said approximately 1,000 Russian soldiers

107

See Uri Friedman, Russia’s Slow-Motion Invasion of Ukraine, ATLANTIC (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/russias-stealthy-slow-motion-invasion-ofukraine/379312/. Russia denies any incursion, Ukraine confirms there is an invasion, and the United States, for
diplomatic reasons, has decided to label Russia’s actions as a “pattern of escalating aggression.” Id.
108 Laura Smith-Spark, Matthew Chance & Michael Martinez, Obama Skeptical of Ceasefire Talks
Between Russia and Ukraine, CNN (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/03/world/europe/ukrainecrisis/; see also Merkel Skeptical About Russia’s Pledge to Pull Back Troops From Ukraine Border, MOSCOW
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/merkel-sceptical-about-russia-s-pledgeto-pull-back-troops-from-ukraine-border/509342.html.
109 Ukraine Says ‘Russian Tank Incursion’ Unacceptable, BBC NEWS (June 12, 2014), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-27815441. President Petro Poroshenko told President Putin that the incursion was
unacceptable, but Russia denied any involvement in such an invasive measure. Id.
110 Thomas Grove, Over 100 Russian Soldiers Killed in Single Ukraine Battle - Russian Rights Activists,
(Aug.
28,
2014),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/28/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-casualtiesREUTERS
idUKKBN0GS20H20140828. Three hundred more soldiers were wounded. Id.
111 Michael Gordon, Russia Moves Artillery Units into Ukraine, NATO Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/europe/russia-moves-artillery-units-into-ukraine-nato-says.html.
112 Ukraine Conflict: Russian Soldiers Seen With “up to 100” Military Vehicles in Ukrainian Villages,
ABC
NEWS,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-28/russians-soldiers-seen-with-military-vehicles-inukraine/5701894 (last updated Aug. 27, 2014).
113 Andrew Kramer & Michael Gordon, Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-novoazovsk-crimea.html.
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invaded the southern border to assist the pro-Russian separatists.114
Additionally, NATO said there were approximately 20,000 Russian troops
stationed at the eastern Ukrainian border.115 Conditions in eastern Ukraine
further deteriorated when ten Russian paratroopers were captured by Ukrainian
forces and were exchanged for sixty-three Ukrainian soldiers.116 President
Putin called for talks of statehood in eastern Ukraine, and the European Union
warned of further sanctions against Russia if it did not de-escalate the crisis.117
This invasion sparked international outrage, and the NATO SecretaryGeneral accused Russia of committing a “blatant violation” of Ukraine’s
sovereignty by engaging in direct military operations to support pro-Russian
rebels.118 NATO condemned Russia by saying its troops “illegally crossed the
border” in an attempt to destabilize the country.119 Russia denied the
allegations, but NATO released satellite imagery revealing a vast number of
Russian troops in Ukraine.120 British Prime Minister David Cameron stated
Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine “must cease immediately.”121 NATO and
the United States vowed to strengthen economic sanctions against Russia if it
did not “step back.”122
Due to Russia’s unwillingness to comply with these NATO and U.S.
demands, NATO created a readiness force of potentially up to 3,000-5,000
troops to deal with Russia.123 The soldiers would be able to respond to any
crisis within a matter of days.124 This countermeasure was done in the event
114 Victoria Butenko, Laura Smith-Spark & Diana Magnay, U.S. Official Says 1,000 Russian Troops Have
Entered Ukraine, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/ (last updated Aug. 29,
2014).
115 NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note 3.
116 Ukraine and Russia Exchange Captured Troops, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-29002147 (last updated Aug. 31, 2014).
117 Putin ‘urges talks on statehood for east Ukraine,’ BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-29003116.
118 Doug Stanglin, NATO Accuses Russia of Violating Ukraine’s Sovereignty, USA TODAY (Aug. 29,
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/29/ukraine-russia-friday/14785073/.
119 Id.
120 Id.; see also Stanglin, supra note 118.
121 Butenko, Smith-Spark & Magnay, supra note 114.
122 Carol Morello, NATO Official Warns of More Sanctions if Russia Does Not ‘step back from the brink,’
WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-detains-ukrainian-militaryofficers-who-fled-attacks-by-pro-moscow-rebels/2014/08/07/8613c994-1e27-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story.
html.
123 Adrian Croft, NATO to Create New ‘spearhead’ Force to Respond to Crises, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2014,
1:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/01/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-military-idUSKBN0GW2SP2014
0901.
124 Id.
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that Russia invaded a NATO territory, like Poland or the Baltics.125 NATO
also sent more fighter aircrafts to the Baltic region and increased military
exercises in Eastern Europe.126 Russia responded by threatening to send more
troops to Crimea.127 The goal of NATO’s exercises was to show Russia that
NATO countries have a serious commitment to one another, and that if one is
attacked or under threat of aggression, then all would come to the aid of their
ally.128
In mid-September 2014, Ukrainian Colonel General Valery Heletey
announced that NATO members had started providing arms to the Ukrainian
government to help them fight the pro-Russian separatists.129 The names of the
countries that delivered the weapons had been withheld, as had the types of
weapons provided.130 Other members denied the statement, but this denial was
expected.131 Ukraine’s Prime Minister said that NATO was the only major line
of defense to protect the country from Russian aggression.132 Although NATO
and the United States have not formally intervened in the conflict in a military
sense, they have taken a stand to support the current Ukrainian government.133
Later that month, there were ceasefire agreements between Ukraine and the
rebels, but these agreements did not last long,134 and many believe the
ceasefires will never bring permanent peace to the region.135 Tensions between
the West and Russia are the highest they have been since the end of the Cold
War. Russia is still supporting the pro-Russian separatists through training and
125

Id.
Id.
127 Russia Threatens to Send More Troops to Crimea over NATO Military Exercise, Ukraine Ratifies EU
Deal, ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-17/russia-threatens-more-troops-in-retaliation-to-natoexercise/5748878 (last updated Sept. 16, 2014).
128 Croft, supra note 123.
129 See NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note 3.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 NATO Arming Ukraine with Soviet Weapons – Deputy PM Rogozin, RT (July 4, 2014, 10:23 AM),
http://rt.com/news/170388-rogozin-ukraine-arms-europe/.
134 See Andrei Makhovsky, Ukraine, Pro-Russian Rebels Reach Ceasefire Deal, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2014,
6:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/05/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSKBN0GZ18D20140905; see also
Laura Smith-Spark & Christine Theodorou, Report: Ukraine, Pro-Russia Rebels Agree to New Ceasefire Deal,
CNN (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/20/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/; Shaun Walker, Ukraine
Ceasefire
Breached
in
Donetsk
and
Mariupol,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
7,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/eastern-ukraine-ceasefire-russia.
135 See James Marson, Truce in Ukraine Spawns Hope, Doubt in West; Ukraine, Russia-Backed Rebels
Agree, But U.S. Europe Keep Sanctions Pressure on Moscow, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/russia-ukraine-and-rebels-meeting-in-minsk-for-talks-on-cease-fire-1409913376.
126
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by supplying them with ammunitions.136 As of November 4, 2014, Russian
troops had moved closer to the eastern border, and more than 4,000 people had
died in the face of the conflict.137
III. NATO’S PURPOSE AND SYSTEMATIC LIMITATIONS
In order to understand NATO, it is best to analyze its main purpose and its
historical development. Specifically, it is best to know NATO’s operational
constraints and limitations. Knowing how NATO works in the face of conflict
is important for understanding the recent developments in Ukraine.
On April 4, 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and NATO was
formed.138 The main purpose of NATO is to “safeguard the freedom and
security of its members through political and military means.”139 It was
founded to deter Soviet expansion into Western Europe and to promote
European integration after the destruction of World War II;140 it currently has
twenty-eight members.141 It serves as the main defense structure in Western
Europe, and the preservation of Ukraine’s independence has been of special
interest to it.142 NATO’s interest in Ukraine makes political and practical sense
considering Ukraine essentially acts as a buffer between Russia and Europe.
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty empowers NATO to act.143 It permits
collective military defense among each NATO member and considers an attack
on one member to be an attack on all members.144 NATO is being tested in a
way it never hoped to be. Ukraine is still not a member of NATO,145 and it

136
137
138
139

Butenko, Smith-Spark & Magnay, supra note 114.
Croft, supra note 123.
A Short History of NATO, NATO, www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2015).
NATO’s Purpose, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm (last updated Oct. 13,

2015).
140

See A Short History of NATO, supra note 138.
Member Countries, NATO, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm (last updated Aug. 20,
2013). The current NATO members are: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the
United States. Id.
142 LEONID POLYAKOV, UKRAINE-NATO RELATIONS AND NEW PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING 72 (2003).
143 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5.
144 Id.
145 Ukraine to Hold Nato Vote When Membership Criteria Are Met, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30176256; see also POLYAKOV, supra note 142, at 6, 9. The country
does partner with the alliance in the partnership for peace program, but that provides no support for military
141
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does not appear that it will become a member in the near future.146 As a result,
NATO cannot militarily engage Russia. However, if Russia takes over
Ukraine, there is a strong and impending danger that Russia will try to
overtake more NATO countries in Europe. This leaves NATO in the
precarious position to either help Ukraine or let the fire spread closer to
Western Europe.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Introduction to Legal Issues
This Part will first examine what NATO may legally do to assist nonmember states by referring to the accepted uses of force in both the U.N. and
NATO Charters. It will then focus on the Kosovo bombing campaign as a case
study. Next, it will examine whether the current Ukrainian government is
legitimate. Eastern Ukraine has rejected and revolted against the current
government in Kiev, resulting in Ukraine being more divided than ever. The
question of legitimacy has profound implications for whether NATO may
provide military assistance of any form to the Ukrainian government so it can
secure its legitimacy over the eastern part of the country without violating
international law.147 If the government is not legitimate, then the United States
and other NATO countries, in the contribution of arms to the current Ukrainian
government, are violating customary international law and the ICJ’s decision
in Nicaragua v. United States.148 In Part V, this Comment touches on the right
of self-determination. More specifically, it will examine whether eastern
Ukraine may engage in external self-determination to unite with Russia, a
country with which it has closer ethnic, cultural, and political ties.

intervention. Additionally, there is not been overwhelming popular support among Ukrainians to formally join
the alliance. Id.
146 Johannes Wamberg Anderson, NATO Deepening Cooperation with Ukraine, But Membership Far
Away, KYIV POST (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/nato-deepeningcooperation-with-ukraine-but-membership-far-away-398628.html; POLYAKOV, supra note 142, at 18–19.
Ukraine may not be able to comply with NATO membership criteria. Furthermore the country would probably
lag behind other NATO members in terms of GDP and defense expenditures. POLYAKOV, supra note 142, at
18–19.
147 See infra Part IV.D.
148 See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits,
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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B. Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter and Article 5 of the NATO
Charter
NATO is constrained by the U.N. Charter for when it may resort to force.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that the use of force against another
state is prohibited, unless an exception applies.149 The United Nations, which is
charged with the goal of preventing aggressive wars and maintaining
international peace, has carved out two exceptions in its Charter for when the
use of force or threat of force may be invoked. First, Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter recognizes a country’s right to self-defense in the event of an armed
attack.150 Second, the U.N. Security Council may vote to engage in the use of
force against a state, so long as nine votes are received from the fifteenmember chamber, with unanimous consent from the five permanent members
(China, Britain, Russia, the United States, and France).151 The authority for this
latter measure comes from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and is best known
as “collective security.”152 There are two articles in the U.N. Charter that
provide measures for how the United Nations may engage in the “collective
security” measure. Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to take action by
“air, sea, or land forces” should measures provided in Article 41 be inadequate
to accomplish the stated goal.153 The purpose of these two exceptions is to
preserve “existing territorial and political arrangements,” not to transform them
or acquire new territory.154
An additional method by which state intervention may be justified is if a
state consents to another state intervening in its affairs.155 Although this
method is not referenced in the U.N. Charter, it has been accepted as a

149

See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
U.N. Charter art. 51 (establishing that self-defense is an “inherent right” in the event an armed attack
occurs).
151 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 235 (3d ed. 2010).
152 CORNELIU BJOLA, LEGITIMISING THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: KOSOVO, IRAQ AND
THE ETHICS OF INTERVENTIONS 48–49 (2009).
153 Compare U.N. Charter art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”),
with U.N. Charter art. 41 (“These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.”).
154 BJOLA, supra note 152, at 48.
155 Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 824 (1999);
See also BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 229.
150
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normative standard in customary international law.156 To summarize, the
following are justifications for the use of force of one state against another
state: Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a valid U.N. Security Council vote to
engage in collective security, and the customary international law norm of a
state’s consent to intervention.157
It is highly unlikely the U.N. Charter would be of any assistance to NATO
or the United States in coming to Ukraine’s aid.158 Although Article 51 permits
Ukraine to use force by way of self-defense, it does not permit NATO to act.
Furthermore, a vote by the U.N. Security Council would be a practical
impossibility because Russia would never vote for intervention on behalf of
Ukraine. Russia could (and likely would) veto any action taken by the Security
Council because it is a permanent member. Additionally, since seizing control
of Ukraine is in Russia’s economic and political interest, it would not vote for
intervention.159
Consent is another means by which Ukraine may allow the United States or
NATO and its members to intervene. Although Ukraine has given consent for
NATO to intervene,160 consent is not a valid justification in this situation. This
Comment argues that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and
does not have effective control of the territory it purports to govern.161 Consent
may only be given by a legitimate government that has “effective control of
most [if not all] of the state.”162
Since the U.N. Charter is a roadblock to NATO action, Article 5 of the
NATO Charter must provide the legal basis. NATO, as a collective selfdefense organization, may be able to use Article 5 to justify the use of force,
but only if the force is used in the face of state aggression. Article 5 of NATO
156 David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 209, 209 (1996).
157 This consent is meaningless and invalid if the Ukrainian government is deemed illegitimate. See infra
Part IV.D.
158 Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter is another important provision. It essentially prohibits U.N. members
from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. The dissenters protesting in eastern Ukraine is an internal
affair of Ukraine. According to Article 2(7), NATO must not intervene in Ukraine. This Comment argues that
NATO is intervening with the supply of weapons, thus violating Article 2(7) and using force in violation of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7.
159 See supra Part II.C.
160 Vasudevan Sridharan, Ukraine Asks Nato to Intervene in the Face of Russian Invasion Threat, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ukraine-asks-nato-intervene-face-russian-invasionthreat-1438523.
161 See infra Part IV.D.
162 Wippman, supra note 156, at 209.

EMERY GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

ANALYZING THE REVOLUTION AND NATO ACTION

2/24/2016 11:25 AM

453

is based on the principles set forth in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. It expands
the right of self-defense by imposing an obligation on each member to come to
the defense of an attacked member. However, NATO must still seek U.N.
approval if it hopes to use force on behalf of a nation that is not a member of
NATO.163 As with any treaty, only members to the North Atlantic Treaty may
rely on Article 5.164 Article 5 has a dual function by acting as a requirement
and a restriction. It posits an obligation among each NATO member to take up
arms for any other member that is attacked and at the same time limits that
obligation to its members.
The question then becomes: what options does NATO have in using force
to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty? NATO members are obliged to take up
arms and defend only other members who are attacked or under threat of
attack.165 Ukraine is not a member of the alliance and thus Article 5, the
building block of NATO, cannot be a justification for intervening on behalf of
the country.166 NATO must provide some alternative justification for any type
of intervention. There is historical precedent with respect to NATO acting on
behalf of non-NATO members, with Kosovo being the most prominent
example. This example implicates the past problems NATO has had in
searching for justifications that excuses their intervention in the affairs of a
non-member state, and also shows the options NATO may be able utilize with
respect to Ukraine.
C. The Intervention in Kosovo
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was largely motivated by a moral and
ethical imperative, which had scant or menial legal justifications and was
comprised of humanitarian intervention and the maintenance of security in
Europe.
Historically, ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo had been oppressed by the
Serbian population.167 In the late 1990s, Serbian forces, under the leadership of
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević, began committing massacres

163 Marjorie Cohn, The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, in LESSONS OF KOSOVO: THE
DANGERS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 121, 131 (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003).
164 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5.
165 See supra Part III.
166 Id.
167 ELLEN HALLAMS, THE UNITED STATES AND NATO SINCE 9/11: THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE
RENEWED 36 (2010).
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against Albanians living in Kosovo to drive them out of the area.168 NATO was
fearful that the fighting between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the
Yugoslav army would develop into a systematic ethnic cleansing of the
Albanian minority.169 In 1999, NATO began bombing Serbian targets in
Kosovo without U.N. authorization, with the intention of forcing Milošević to
withdraw his armed forces from Kosovo.170 U.N. authorization for the mission
was not sought because it was a foregone conclusion that two of the five
permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and China, would veto
any vote to intervene in Kosovo.171 The air campaign lasted seventy-eight
days, Milošević withdrew his forces, and, in the end, NATO prevailed.172
NATO’s decision to intervene on behalf of Kosovo against Yugoslavia
was, and has remained, controversial. The decision remains controversial
because no NATO country was attacked or under the threat of attack, yet
NATO acted anyway. The thrust behind the intervention seemed to come from
the eagerness of NATO countries to “avert a moral, humanitarian
catastrophe.”173 Another reason for NATO’s action stemmed from the idea of
asserting NATO’s dominance in the post-Cold War era.174 In short, NATO’s
action against Yugoslavia stemmed more from a higher ethical and moral
imperative than any legal basis or treaty obligation.
1. NATO’s Legal Justifications for Intervention in Kosovo
Notwithstanding NATO’s ethical and moral motivations to act in Kosovo,
the action could only be legal if NATO acted within the parameters established
by the U.N. or NATO Charters. The U.N. Charter provides no legal
justification for NATO’s use of force, and the NATO Charter also fails to
provide any legal justification for NATO’s actions in Kosovo. NATO gave two
reasons for intervening in Kosovo: humanitarian intervention and a “risk to
regional stability.”

168

IVO DAALDER & MICHAEL O’HANLON, WINNING UGLY: NATO’S WAR TO SAVE KOSOVO 1–3 (2000).
Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 104 (1999).
170 HALLAMS, supra note 167, at 40.
171 Richard Falk, Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, in LESSONS OF KOSOVO: THE DANGERS OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 31, 35 (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003).
172 DAALDER & O’HANLON, supra note 168, at 3.
173 HALLAMS, supra note 167, at 38–39 (“UK Defence Minister George Robertson cited the need to
‘reduce the Serbs capacity to repress the Albanian population and thus avert a humanitarian disaster.’”). U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, “[w]e are not going to stand by and watch Serb authorities do in
Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia,” that being ethnic cleansing. Id.
174 Falk, supra note 171, at 35.
169
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a. Article 5 of the U.N. and NATO Charters
NATO did not seek a U.N. Security Council vote to authorize the
intervention because Russia and China would have inevitably rejected the
request.175 Moreover, Article 53 of the U.N. Charter176 posed an additional
obstacle to NATO. Article 53 prohibits “regional enforcement actions” taken
by “regional organizations” without a U.N. Security Council vote.177 Article 53
does not prohibit NATO from acting on behalf of another NATO country;
Article 51 provides an independent basis for that action.178 NATO claimed that
Article 53 did not restrain its ability to act collectively because it was an
“alliance” and not a “regional organization.”179 However, this interpretation is
unreasonable because it would allow NATO to circumvent U.N. Security
Council authorization at any time.180 As such, the United Nations considers
NATO to be a “regional organization” constrained by Article 53.181
Since the U.N. Charter provided no legal basis for intervening, the legal
justification had to derive from Article 5 of the NATO Charter. However,
Article 5 of the NATO Charter was inapplicable to the situation in Kosovo
because the country was not a member of NATO. Article 5 obligates the
signatories to collective self-defense and could not be used in favor of Kosovo.
Furthermore, no NATO country was under the threat of attack. Given the
limited number of legal bases available to NATO in the decision to intervene
in Kosovo, there was a scramble among NATO members and the international
community to find some legal justification for the intervention.
b. Humanitarian Intervention
Although NATO countries could not base their decision to intervene on the
NATO Charter,182 Germany and Belgium were the only two NATO countries
to give humanitarian intervention as the official legal basis for the Kosovo

175

See supra Part IV.B.
See U.N. Charter art. 53, ¶ 1 (“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council . . . .”).
177 Falk, supra note 171, at 36.
178 Id. at 50.
179 See id. at 36.
180 The anti-interventionists rejected this argument. Id.
181 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1999).
182 No NATO member was attacked or under threat of attack. See infra Part IV.C.1.a.
176
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bombings.183 Humanitarian intervention is, perhaps, the most legitimate reason
for acting in Kosovo. Even then, humanitarian intervention straddles the line of
legitimacy and basks in a twilight zone, at least with respect to intervention
and the U.N. Charter.184 Even though the actions of NATO were condemned, it
was given some form of ratification by the U.N. Security Council.185 Kosovo
serves as an example of an emerging form of intervention. NATO is not likely
to engage in this sort of action with Ukraine, however, because the
humanitarian reasons to do so are rather weak, and it would receive great
scrutiny from the international community as another circumvention of the
United Nations. The issue in Kosovo was ethnic cleansing, but the issue in
Ukraine is primarily one of political and territorial integrity. These are
different issues and humanitarian intervention in Ukraine would be an
insufficient reason to intervene.
The ICJ spoke on the issue of humanitarian intervention when Yugoslavia
sued NATO countries because of the bombing.186 The Court had to dismiss the
case on a jurisdictional basis, but did say “[t]he Court is profoundly concerned
with the use of force in Yugoslavia and that it raised very serious questions of
international law.”187 The only time the Court came close to prescribing a legal
standard on humanitarian intervention was in Nicaragua v. United States,
discussed later in this Comment, where the Court prescribed that the excessive
use of force by the United States could not be the “appropriate means” to
ensure respect for human rights.188
c. Regional Instability Argument
NATO countries gave another reason for the bombing campaign. As
mentioned earlier, only two NATO countries, Germany and Belgium, gave
humanitarian intervention as the reason for the campaign.189 Other NATO
countries said that there was a “need to bring stability to the region” and

183

JOHAN D.
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(2010).
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Cohn, supra note 163, at 136.
VAN DER VYVER, supra note 183, at 233–34.
Cohn, supra note 163, at 136.
Id.
The ICJ said that an attack must be compatible with the aim of humanitarian intervention. Id. at 136–

37.
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See supra Part IV.C.1.b.
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“prevent instability spreading in the region.”190 However, while Article 2 of the
NATO Charter mentions “promoting conditions of stability and well-being,”191
the nature of that broad objective is limited to NATO parties. It provides no
legal approach to justify intervention against a non-NATO member and
therefore lends no credence to the regional instability argument.
2. NATO’s Kosovo Campaign and its Effect on Ukraine
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was the most recent example of NATO
flexing its muscles for the purpose of stabilizing peace and security in Europe.
NATO could proffer an ethical and moral argument for the actions it took in
Kosovo, but it would not be able to support the argument with a legitimate
legal basis. Article 5 was inapplicable, Article 51 was inapplicable, and the
United Nations gave no authorization under Chapter VII.192 It stretched legal
parameters thin in search for a justification, and the intervention was
condemned as an international travesty. The circumstances of ethnic cleansing
or genocide may cause NATO to act in this way in the future, but no such
justification can be used to intervene on behalf of Ukraine. While there have
been deaths in Ukraine, it does not rise to the level of ethnic cleansing or
justify any such use of the phrase “humanitarian intervention.”193
Kosovo’s intervention is inapposite to intervention in Ukraine because of
the lack of a humanitarian crisis. If NATO wants to legitimately intervene in
Ukraine, then it must get U.N. approval. However, seeking approval would be
futile, considering Russia would veto any such self-condemning measure.
NATO’s hopes to intervene, even with Kosovo looming in the background as
precedent for intervention on behalf of a non-NATO member, are not likely to
be fulfilled because U.N. approval is not available and humanitarian
190

Nina Graeger & Alexandra Novosseloff, The Role of the OSCE and the EU, in THE UNITED NATIONS
Waheguru P. Singh Sidhu eds., 2003).

AND REGIONAL SECURITY 75, 87 (Michael Pugh &
191 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2.

192 BJOLA, supra note 152, at 104. Although the Security Council did not give express authorization for
NATO to act, it did give them some blessings by enacting Resolutions 1160 and 1203, which called for
violence to stop in Kosovo and expressed concern about the situation in Kosovo as a threat to the “peace and
security” in the region, respectively. Id.
193 Compare BJOLA, supra note 152, at 58 (explaining that the number of refugees in Kosovo was north of
800,000 and at least 10,500 Kosovar Albanians had been killed by the Serbs when Milošević capitulated, and
there had been a long history of animus among the Serbians for the Kosovar Albanians), and Brendan Stone,
The U.S.-NATO Military Intervention in Kosovo: Triggering Ethnic Conflict as a Pretext for Intervention,
GLOBAL RES. (Dec. 29, 2005), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-u-s-nato-military-intervention-in-kosovo/
1666 (explaining that prior to the intervention, 1,500 Kosovar Albanians were killed and more than 400,000
were removed from their homes), with Croft, supra note 123.
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justifications are weak. NATO cannot look to Kosovo as a justification to
intervene in Ukraine, barring the occurrence of some drastic humanitarian
event.
Notwithstanding these conclusions, NATO has decided to assist Ukraine in
more than one aspect. Although the intervention is not based on direct military
engagement, it does positively affect Ukraine’s ability to thwart off Russian
aggression, even if it is a slight effect. Multiple reports have stated that NATO
countries have begun sending non-lethal military weapons to the Ukrainian
government to assist in suppressing the dissenters in eastern Ukraine, although
some NATO countries have either (expectedly) denied this report or declined
to comment.194 President Obama made it clear that NATO needed to make
“concrete commitments” to help Ukraine modernize and strengthen its military
forces.195 Furthermore, NATO surveillance planes have given information to
Ukraine that the country may not have obtained otherwise.196 In early February
2015, there were serious discussions between the United States and NATO to
assist the Ukrainian government in obtaining lethal weapons.197
Providing lethal weapons to Ukraine is a patent violation of international
law according to Nicaragua.198 Providing non-lethal weapons may not appear
to be as patent a violation; however, this Comment argues that they constitute a
use of force for two reasons. First, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
defined non-lethal weapons as weapons that are “designed and primarily
employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing
fatalities . . . .”199 By definition, the DOD admits that fatalities may occur as a
result of non-lethal weapons, and there is no reason to preclude non-lethal
194 See NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note 3; see also Stephen Lendman, U.S.NATO Delivering Arms to Ukraine. The Planning of Aggression Against Russia, GLOBAL RES. (Dec. 14,
2015), http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-nato-delivering-arms-to-ukraine-the-planning-of-aggression-againstrussia/5419850; NATO Countries Have Begun Arms Deliveries to Ukraine: Defense Minister, REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/14/us-ukraine-crisis-heletey-idUSKBN0H90PP20140914 (last updated
Sept. 14, 2014).
195 Obama Says NATO Should Help Strengthen Ukraine’s Army, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Sept.
3, 2015), http://www.rferl.org/content/obama-estonia-nato-ukraine-russia/26565158.html.
196 Nate Rawlings, NATO Deploys Planes to Monitor Ukraine Border, TIME (Mar. 12, 2014), http://time.
com/21114/nato-deploys-planes-to-monitor-ukraine-border/.
197 See Julian Barnes, U.S. Weapons to Ukraine Could Take Months, Officials Say, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-weapons-to-ukraine-could-take-months-officials-say-1423693717; see
also Michael Gordon & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Considers Supplying Arms to Ukraine Forces, Officials Say, N. Y.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/world/us-taking-a-fresh-look-at-arming-kievforces.html.
198 See infra Part IV.E.2.
199 Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, U.S. Dep’t of Def. Directive No. 3000.3, ¶ C (July 9, 1996).
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weapons from the guise of Article (2)(4). Second, it is conceivable to say that
non-lethal weapons could be seen as using force against the dissenters in
eastern Ukraine.200 Use of force need not always be lethal. The ICJ envisioned
scenarios that involved the use of force that may not rise to the level of lethal
or armed attacks.201 This Comment adopts the view that non-lethal weapons
constitute “use of force” under the U.N. Charter.202
D. Ukraine’s Current Government and its Legitimacy
NATO responded to Russia’s invasion of Crimea by strengthening their
forces in Eastern Europe, imposing sanctions on Russia, and delivering arms to
the Ukrainian government.203 By intervening in this conflict, NATO is
providing arms to an illegitimate government. The current government in Kiev
was placed into power with little regard for due process and was not
established legally. Specifically, the Verkhovna Rada’s removal of President
Yanukovych was unconstitutional.204 The interim government had no authority
to establish the elections subsequent to the ouster. In addition, the current
government, which would not be in power but for Ukraine’s unconstitutional
ouster, does not have effective control over Ukraine.
1. Legitimacy Requirements of a Government
As a political matter, many states no longer weigh in on the legitimacy of
foreign governments.205 This abstention from making validity judgments stems
from what is known as the Estrada Doctrine and is premised on the idea of a
state not interfering with, or sitting in judgment of, another state’s internal
affairs.206 Regardless of the political decisions countries make, there is a legal
test that a government must meet in order to be considered legitimate. Three
cases set forth the criteria for a government to be considered legitimate:
Republic of Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake & Carey,207 Great Britain v. Costa

200 See David Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 51, 79 (1999).
201 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J.
14, ¶ 247 (June 27).
202 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
203 See supra Parts II.D–E.
204 Sindelar, supra note 62.
205 STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE 3 (1998).
206 See Phillip C. Jessup, The Estrada Doctrine, 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 719, 723 (1931).
207 Republic of Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake & Carey, [1993] Q.B. 54 (Eng.).
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Rica (“Tinoco Arbitration”),208 and Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of
Cyprus v. Feldman (“Northern Cyprus”).209 Somalia sets forth the basic
criteria for governmental legitimacy,210 while the latter two cases primarily
focus on a single factor of the basic criteria.211
Somalia establishes four legal factors for determining whether a
government is legitimate.212 It was presented to the Queen’s Bench Division,
which is one of the three divisions of the High Court of Justice of England and
Wales (the “High Court”).213 At the time Judge Hobhouse heard the case, the
United Kingdom embraced the Estrada Doctrine by promulgating the
following declaration:
We have conducted a re-examination of British policy and practice
concerning the recognition of governments. This has included a
comparison with the practice of our partners and allies. On the basis
of this review, we have decided that we shall no longer accord
recognition to governments . . . . Like them, we shall continue to
decide the nature of our dealings with regimes which come to power
unconstitutionally in the light of our assessment of whether they are
able of themselves to exercise effective control of the territory of the
State concerned, and seem likely to continue to do so.214

Nevertheless, the High Court felt this was unhelpful and decided to provide
a legal test to determine whether the Somalia government was legitimate.215
The basic facts of Somalia are as follows. In 1991, the Republic of Somalia
purchased a cargo of rice, but it was never delivered because the master of the
ship considered the port dangerous due to fighting in the country.216 The rice
was sold and the proceeds were placed in a court in London.217 Somalia
demanded the proceeds to be delivered to the government, but the High Court
208

Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica, 1 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 369, 371 (1923).
Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg (Northern Cyprus), 917 F.2d 278 (7th
Cir. 1990).
210 Somalia, Q.B. 54 at 68.
211 Gr. Brit.,1 R.I.A.A. at 382; see also Northern Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 293 (quoting Williams v. Bruffy, 96
U.S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716 (1878)).
212 Somalia, Q.B. 54 at 68.
213 Queen’s Bench Division, JUSTICE (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcj-rollsbuilding/queens-bench.
214 Somalia, Q.B. 54 at 62.
215 Id. at 63.
216 Benedict Kingsbury, Judicial Determination of Foreign “Government” Status, 109 L.Q. REV. 377,
377 (1993). The former President of Somalia, Siad Barre, was ousted and various political factions resulted in
a civil war, with many entities claiming to be the legitimate government of the region. Id.
217 Id.
209

EMERY GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

2/24/2016 11:25 AM

ANALYZING THE REVOLUTION AND NATO ACTION

461

rejected the demand because there was doubt as to whether the representative
making the demand had the appropriate authority to do so.218 Somalia was
under an interim government at the time of the demand due to civil war.219
Judge Hobhouse set forth the following legal analysis for assessing whether a
government could indeed be deemed legitimate:
(a) [W]hether it is the constitutional government of the state; (b) the
degree, nature and stability of administrative control, if any, that it of
itself exercises over the territory of the state; (c) whether Her
Majesty’s Government has any dealings with it and if so what is the
nature of those dealings; and (d) in marginal cases, the extent of
international recognition that it has as the government of the state.220

The High Court ruled that on the first three factors, the government making
the demand was illegitimate, and thus had no authority to make such a demand
for the proceeds.221 The High Court did not analyze the fourth factor since the
government failed the first three factors.
The test in Somalia provides the courts with clear guidance when assessing
whether a government is legitimate. A government can be legitimate either de
jure or de facto. If the government is established de jure, then there should be
an automatic presumption of validity. However, if the government that
purports to exist is not derived by lawful means, then it is a de facto
government. Generally, a de facto government will be accorded legitimacy
only if it maintains effective control over the territory it purports to govern.222
The “effective control” test is a method for testing the legitimacy of a
government, but this Comment argues that the test from Somalia is more
complete, as it encompasses a more holistic view in asserting whether a
government is legitimate. This test will demonstrate more strongly than the
effective control test why the Ukrainian government is illegitimate.
The factor of effective control is appropriately elaborated in Tinoco
Arbitration223 and Northern Cyprus.224 In Tinoco Arbitration, the Tinoco

218

Id. at 377–78.
Id. at 377.
220 Somalia, Q.B. 54 at 68.
221 Id.
222 Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica, 1 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 369, 371, 382 (1923); Autocephalous Greek
Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg (Northern Cyprus), 917 F.2d 278, 293 (7th Cir. 1990).
223 Gr. Brit., 1 R.I.A.A. at 371.
224 Northern Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 278.
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regime overthrew the previous government to come to power.225 Great Britain
tried to enforce agreements entered into by the Tinoco regime, but Costa Rica
denied the enforcement of the agreements because the Tinoco regime was not a
de facto or de jure government.226 The Tinoco regime was rather peaceful and
no other entity claimed to be the rightful government of the country.227 The
case hinged on whether the government “established itself in such a way that
all within its influence recognize[d] its control, and that there [was] no
opposing force assuming to be a government in its place.”228 In Tinoco
Arbitration, the arbitrators were concerned about whether the government had
the acquiescence of the people it governed.229 The panel found that people
accepted the government and that there was no other government claiming to
be the actual legitimate government.230 Thus, a de facto government existed.231
Furthermore, Northern Cyprus reiterates the notion that a de facto
government must show control. The principles of this case maintain that
territorial control of a government is a key factor in establishing whether the de
facto government has enough effective control for it to become a
government.232 The court stated, “[t]he Turkish forces, despite their best
efforts, did not completely supplant the Republic nor its officers . . . [it] only
acceded to the control of the northern portion of Cyprus.”233 This implies that
in addition to acquiescence, courts can generally look to territorial control.
Thus, in finding the existence of effective control the court should look to
acquiescence of the State’s population, the lack of an opposing entity claiming
to be the legitimate government, and territorial control over the entirety of the
country, as opposed to just a portion of it.

225

Gr. Brit., 1 R.I.A.A. at 376.
Id. at 377.
227 Id. at 379.
228 Id. at 382.
229 See id. at 379.
230 See id.
231 Id. at 381.
232 See Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg (Northern Cyprus), 917 F.2d 278,
293–94 (7th Cir. 1990).
233 Id. at 293.
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2. Applying the Law of Legitimacy to Ukraine’s Government
a. Ukraine’s Unconstitutional Ouster
The first factor of the Somalia test asks whether the current Ukrainian
government arrived to power out of the procedural manners set forth in
Ukraine’s Constitution.234 Essentially, if the government did not come into
power by operation of law, that being the Constitution, then it would fail to
satisfy the first factor. Upon analyzing the facts in Ukraine, this Comment
argues that there was no legal basis for the ouster of former President
Yanukovych and the implementation of the new government. It was a
revolutionary play that held no regard for Constitutional authority.
Ukraine may have an issue as to which Constitution controls the country,
however, both Constitutions are similar and require the same analysis in
determining the legitimacy of the current government.235 In February 2014,
President Yanukovych was supposed to reinstate the 2004 Constitution,
pursuant to a peace deal with the European Union.236 The reinstatement would
have weakened Presidential authority.237 However, President Yanukovych
never reinstated the 2004 Consitution.238 Regardless of the applicability of
either Constitution, both contain identical impeachment procedures in Article
111 and grant the Verkhovna Rada the power to commence an impeachment
proceeding in Article 85.239 Additionally, both Constitutions give the
Verkhovna Rada the right to commence an impeachment procedure against the
President “if he commits treason or other crime.”240
Furthermore, both Constitutions require three-quarters of the
“constitutional composition” of the Verkhovna Rada to vote in favor of
impeachment to remove the President.241 Of 450 members, 328 voted to oust
President Yanukovych.242 This did not meet the three-quarters requirement of
234

See generally CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE Dec. 8, 2004, art. 111.
See Sindelar, supra note 62.
236 Id.
237 See id.
238 Id.
239 See CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE Dec. 8, 2004, arts. 85, 111; CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE Dec. 1, 1991,
arts. 85, 111.
240 Sindelar, supra note 62.
241 See CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE Dec. 8, 2004, art. 111; CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE Dec. 1, 1991, art.
111; see also Ashley Deeks, Russia in Ukraine: A Reader Responds, LAWFARE BLOG (Mar. 5, 2014, 1:30 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/russia-in-ukraine-a-reader-responds/.
242 Sindelar, supra note 62.
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337 votes.243 On the textual basis of the Constitution, the ouster was not legal
or in accordance within any Constitutional procedure. There was no legal basis
for the ouster and it appears to be nothing more than a political rejection of
Russian integration.
The Verkhovna Rada may cite to Yanukovych’s abandoning the office of
the Presidency as support for the legitimacy of the ouster, or they may even
cite the deaths that occurred during the protests in the Maidan.244 However,
these reasons do not support inculpation of treason or that he was guilty of
some crime. It is difficult to show Yanukovych was the sole person responsible
or even was a conspirator in the deaths of those at the Maidan and the evidence
does not support him being guilty of a crime.
Even still, if one were to accept these rather weak reasons, the fact remains
that the votes needed to impeach Yanukovych were not obtained. Furthermore,
an investigation and judgment from the Constitutional Court must occur before
a Ukranian president can be impeached, and neither of these happened.245 The
appointed interim government was not legitimate, and the current government
that was established by the interim government is not legitimate. Since the
current government is unconstitutional, it cannot be considered a government
that is de jure or established by law. To be legitimized, it would have to show
that it has effective control over the territory, as a de facto government
would.246
b. Ukraine’s Lack of Control
The current Ukrainian government must show that it has administrative
control over the territory if it hopes to be classified as legitimate. In applying
the law of Tinoco Arbitration and Northern Cyprus to the facts in Ukraine, the
current government cannot be said to have effective control. Thus, it does not
meet the second factor of the Somalia test. The current government maintains
effective control over the western half of the country, but not the eastern half.
It has lost Crimea to Russia, the eastern territory is having referendums to
243

Deeks, supra note 241.
Sindelar, supra note 62.
245 Ronan Keenan, The US Should Stop Calling Ukraine’s New Government ‘Legitimate,’ GEOPOLITICAL
MONITOR (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-us-should-stop-calling-ukraines-newgovernment-legitimate-4955/.
246 See Republic of Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake & Carey, [1993] Q.B. 54, 67 (Eng.). The High Court
noted the “effective control” factor was critical in establishing whether a de facto government can be labeled
legitimate. Id.
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secede, and the fighting and bloodshed has not stopped between the
government and the dissenters in the eastern part of the country.247
When assessing this factor with respect to Ukraine, the current government
of Ukraine has little control over the eastern territory. In March 2014, Interim
President Turchynov stated that the government had “practically lost control of
the east of the country” and described his security forces as “helpless” when it
comes to fighting the pro-Russian dissenters.248 Given the voting on secession
referendums in eastern Ukraine, as well as the inability to control the proRussian dissenters,249 the government has little control over a sizeable portion
of the country. The eastern part of the country still believes that Yanukovych is
the rightful President of Ukraine, views the ouster as unconstitutional, and
rejects the current government.250 This claim has strong merit.
The current government cannot be said to have taken power with support
from a substantial number of the individuals in Ukraine. The eastern part of the
country is still rebelling and calling for separation, all while claiming the
illegitimacy of the current government.251 Furthermore, the western half of the
country is not under the current government’s control, as the pro-Russian
dissenters have control of at least 193 square miles of eastern Ukrainian
territory.252 The eastern and western parts of Ukraine could not be more at
odds with one another. The factor of effective control is not fulfilled, and the
current government is not legitimate.
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See supra Parts II.B–D.
Luke Harding, Ukraine’s Government Has Lost Control of East, Says Acting President, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/30/ukraine-government-lost-control-east-actingpresident.
249 See supra Part II.C.
250 Tom Kutch, Ukrainians in the South and East Oppose Pro-Western Leadership, AL JAZEERA AM.
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/27/in-ukraine-s-eastdivisionnotdissolution.html.
251 Id. As of 2009, the four most eastern Ukrainan provinces (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and
Kherson), excluding Crimea, represented approximately twenty percent of the country’s population, with a
little over nine million people. See State Statistics Comm. of Ukr., All Ukrainian Population Census ‘2001
(Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/news/article;891/ [http://web.archive.org/web/201003121
74321/] (citing state statistics from 2009).
252 Gordon & Schmitt, supra note 197. Ukraine as a country is approximately 233,000 square miles.
Matthew Guariglia, Donetsk People’s Republic: 5 Fun Facts You Need to Know, HEAVY (July 17, 2014, 4:14
PM),
http://heavy.com/news/2014/07/donetsk-peoples-republic-ukraine-russia-malaysia-flight-shot-downamericans/. In July 2014, the rebels controlled 10,000 square miles, a territory approximately the size of
Maryland. Id. The Crimean peninsula is approximately 10,000 square miles. Marc Lallanilla, 5 Key Facts
About Crimea, LIVESCIENCE (Mar. 3, 2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.livescience.com/43815-facts-about-crimeaukraine-russia.html.
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c. Ability to Deal with Other Governments
In contrast, the current Ukrainian government has been regarded as
legitimate by NATO and the United States.253 NATO has dealt with the current
government as if it is the legitimate government of the country through
supplying arms to extinguish the rebellion in the eastern half of the country.254
Even if Ukraine were to show they are still entering into negotiations and
relations with other governments, this is not a strong enough factor by itself to
make the government legal and legitimate.
d. The Extent of International Recognition of the Entity as the
Government of the State in Question
This factor need not be analyzed because the court in Somalia held, “where
an unconstitutional entity exercised little or no effective control, no amount of
recognition could entitle it to claim state property in an English court.”255 As
has been established earlier in this Comment, the current Ukrainian
government has little effective control over the country, and its power is not
derived from the Constitution.
E. NATO’s Intervention in Ukraine: A Violation of International Law?
NATO members intervened in the conflict by supplying weapons to the
Ukrainian government.256 Ukraine’s Defense Minister, Valery Heletey, said, “I
have no right to disclose any specific country we reached that agreement with.
But the fact is that those weapons are already on the way to us - that’s
absolutely true, I can officially tell you.”257 Based on the statements from
Ukraine’s Defense Minister, it is evident that some NATO countries have
provided arms to fight against the dissenters in the eastern half of the

253 Keenan, supra note 245; see supra Part II.E; see also Russia’s Accusations - Setting the Record
Straight, NATO (July 16, 2014), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_07/20140716_140716Factsheet_Russia_en.pdf.
254 See supra Part II.E.
255 Kingsbury, supra note 216, at 380.
256 See NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note 3.
257 Richard Balmforth, NATO Countries Have Begun Arms Deliveries to Ukraine: Defense Minister,
REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2014, 6:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/14/us-ukraine-crisis-heleteyidUSKBN0H90PP20140914.
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country.258 NATO has not deployed soldiers to the region, but its SecretaryGeneral, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has not precluded the possibility.259
The United States has provided assistance to Ukraine, but has limited the
assistance to supplying night vision goggles, body armor, and communications
equipment.260 The United States is also planning to deploy military soldiers to
Ukraine for training purposes.261 As of early February 2015, the United States
had strongly considered sending arms to Ukraine.262 Additionally, the United
States Congress passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which authorized
President Obama to use lethal and non-lethal aid to support Ukraine.263 NATO
members and the United States have intervened with non-lethal aid, and
seemed poised to act with lethal aid.264 If either NATO or the United States
were to aid Ukraine with weapons and train its soldiers, then it would violate a
fundamental principle of the ICJ’s decision in the Nicaragua case described
below. Additionally, NATO would be acting outside the confines of Article 5
of the NATO Charter, since Ukraine is not a NATO member.
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
The facts of the Nicaragua case are as follows. The United States armed
and trained rebels (known as the contras) in the hopes they would overthrow
the existing Sandinista government.265 The contras would come from nearby
nations and try to instigate rebellion in Nicaragua to destabilize the
government.266 Nicaragua filed suit against the United States in the ICJ for
arming and training the contras.267 Nicaragua alleged that the United States
violated the general prohibition against the use of force as found in Article 2(4)

258

Id.
Croft, supra note 123.
260 Chuck Vinch, US Sending Advisors, Gear to Ukraine, USA TODAY (June 5, 2014, 10:37 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/05/us-sending-advisers-gear-to-ukraine-/10046845/.
261 Niles Williamson, US Announces Plan to Deploy Military Advisers to Ukraine, GLOBAL RES. (Jan. 23,
2015), http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-announces-plans-to-deploy-military-advisers-to-ukraine/5426477.
262 Gordon & Schmitt, supra note 197.
263 Stephen Lendman, US-NATO Delivering Arms to Ukraine. The Planning of Aggression Against
Russia, GLOBAL RES. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-nato-delivering-arms-to-ukraine-theplanning-of-aggression-against-russia/5419850.
264 See Gordon & Schmitt, supra note 197; see also Brianna Lee, Ukraine Crisis: US, European Officials
Split Over Sending Arms To Ukraine, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/ukraine-crisisus-european-officials-split-over-sending-arms-ukraine-1807116.
265 BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 233.
266 Id.
267 Id.
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of the U.N. Charter and unlawfully intervened in the affairs of Nicaragua,
prohibited by Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.268 The United States
counterclaimed that Nicaragua was arming groups in El Salvador and was
engaged in “trans-border military incursions,”269 and asserted that arming the
contras was collective self-defense.270 The Court found that the evidence of
Nicaragua supplying arms to groups in El Salvador was rather weak.271 The
Court looked to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, which prescribes generally the
sources of international law, to establish the governing law.272
The Court put forth a number of basic legal propositions in rendering its
decision, all of which will form a legal basis for addressing the current
situation in Ukraine. The basic propositions are more pertinent to this
Comment than the actual outcome in the Nicaragua case because they will
provide the basis for the argument that NATO is violating the ICJ’s decision.
First, the Court found that the parties to the case, Nicaragua and the United
States, accepted that prohibitions on the “use of force” and the “exceptions to
the use of force” in the U.N. Charter as a part of customary international
law.273 Second, the Court stipulated that self-defense may only be justified by
an armed attack, and arming and assisting rebels does not rise to the level of an
armed attack.274 However, the Court did find that assisting and arming rebels
could breach the “non-use of force” and non-interventionists principles found
in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, respectively.275 More
specifically, the Court stated that the supply of arms or other “such activities”
would be considered a use of force in violation of international law.276
Thus, if State A commits an armed attack against State B, then State B
would be permitted to use force against State A on the basis of self-defense. If
State A uses force against State B, or intervenes in State B’s affairs, then State
A would be in violation of international law. However, that does not
268 Michael Schmitt, Legitimacy Versus Legality Redux: Arming the Syrian Rebels, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY
L. & POL’Y 139, 141 (2014).
269 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14,
¶¶ 160, 164 (June 27).
270 Id. ¶ 165.
271 Id. ¶ 153
272 Id. ¶ 172; see Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, Apr. 18, 1946, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute looks to treaties, customary international law, general principles of
law, judicial decisions, and highly qualifies publicists in establishing the governing law. Id.
273 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶¶ 187–88.
274 Id. ¶ 195.
275 Id. ¶ 247.
276 See id.
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necessarily permit State B to use force against State A in the name of selfdefense since it was not an armed attack. Additionally, the Court found that the
principle of non-intervention found in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter is
customary international law and “forbids all states or groups of states to
intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other states.”277
In this case, the Court ruled that the United States had no right to intervene
because Nicaragua’s aid to the rebels in El Salvador did not rise to the level of
an armed attack.278 Hence, the United States violated international law by
aiding the rebels and supplying them with arms and training, which constituted
a “use of force” and had unjustifiably intervened, for the purpose of toppling a
legitimate government.279 The United States had no right to take any defensive
measures since there was no evidence of an armed attack. The basic principles
from this case will be helpful in elucidating and providing an analogy as to
why NATO is violating Nicaragua in Ukraine.
2. Applying the Nicaragua Analysis to Ukraine
While the conflicts at issue in Nicaragua and Ukraine are dissimilar, the
fundamental principles of the case can serve as a useful guide in evaluating the
legality of NATO’s actions. Providing weapons (lethal or non-lethal) and
training exercises to Ukraine’s illegitimate government for the purpose of
suppressing protesters in eastern Ukraine violates basic principles of
international law and the ICJ’s decision in Nicaragua.
Much like in Nicaragua, a regional organization of governments (NATO),
primarily led by the United States, is sending weapons to an illegitimate and
illegal entity for the purpose of establishing and attaining its legitimacy. The
current Ukrainian government unconstitutionally ousted a legitimate
government on the basis that its political leanings were not in accordance with
those residing in the western part of the country. It is an illegitimate body that
is receiving military support from NATO members in the form of weapons,
joint military exercises, and advice.280 This is much like the United States
aiding the rebels in Nicaragua because both entities are illegitimate.
277

Id. ¶¶ 202–05.
Id. ¶ 195; BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 234.
279 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 195.
280 See NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note 3; see also Tim Shipman & Ian
Drury, Ukraine to Hold Joint Military Exercises with U.S. and Britain After Announcing Troop Withdrawal
from Crimea, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2584693/Ukraine-holdjoint-military-exercises-U-S-Britain-announcing-troop-withdrawal-Crimea.html; Maggie Ybarra, Obama
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NATO is permitting and encouraging its members to supply this
illegitimate government with weapons in order to seize the eastern part of the
country.281 In Nicaragua, the United States was trying to tear down a
legitimate government, but in Ukraine, the United States, along with other
NATO members, is attempting to build and foment an illegitimate government
by aiding it with weapons so it can secure its power and have “effective
control” over the territory in eastern Ukraine. By arguing the inverse of
Nicaragua, the ICJ could very well find that the same legal principles from
Nicaragua could easily render NATO members in clear violation of the U.N.
Charter. NATO members are violating Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter by
using force (as defined in Nicaragua), and Article 2(7) by intervening in the
internal affairs of Ukraine because Ukraine is not a NATO member.
Although this government may not take the form of rebels, it stems from
unlawful activity and is no more legitimate than a coup. Ukrainians in the
eastern half of the country reject it and protest against the destructive behavior
of those who established it. NATO’s duties do not legally encapsulate the
building of an illegitimate government for the sake of political purposes and
NATO should restrict its members from engaging in this situation.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Current reports have indicated that the United States is willing to offer
lethal arms to support the Ukrainian government.282 Not only would this action
patently violate international law and strengthen the gravity of the violation,283
it would be a profound moral mistake. The aim of this Comment is to steer the
current conflict away from violence and avoid the use of force. Benjamin
Ferencz, the last remaining prosecutor from the Nuremberg trials, is a strong
advocate of avoiding war and limiting the use of force. He has said, “[y]ou

Orders Pentagon Advisers to Ukraine to Fend Off Putin-Backed Rebels, WASH. TIMES (July 22, 2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/22/pentagon-team-dispatched-to-ukraine-amid-crisiswi/?page=all.
281 See NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note 3; see also NATO Countries Have
Begun Arms Deliveries to Ukraine: Defense Minister, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/09/14/us-ukraine-crisis-heletey-idUSKBN0H90PP20140914; Obama Says NATO Should Help
Strengthen Ukraine’s Army, supra note 195.
282 See Gordon & Schmitt, supra note 197; NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note
3.
283 See supra Part III.E.2.
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cannot kill an ideology with a gun, you only create more enemies.”284 This is
an insightful statement that provides a normative, moral guide in terms of how
countries should view the use of force. NATO and the United States should
avoid using force in Ukraine through the supplying of weapons. In diplomatic
terms, supplying Ukraine with weapons to quell the protests in eastern Ukraine
would only further foment hostile tensions between the West and Russia.
In lieu of supplying weapons, NATO and the United States should foster a
dialogue centered around either moral condemnation or diplomacy. Some
concessions must be made for the sake of limiting violence and force. More
specifically, the western half of Ukraine should consider the possibility of
letting eastern Ukraine secede.
International law is generally hostile to secession. It allows for it in only
two situations: (1) the entire population of the country—not just inhabitants of
the seceding region—votes in favor of secession by substantial majority; or (2)
following an armed conflict, distinct territories of an existing state agree to part
ways under a peace treaty and boundaries are redrawn under that treaty.285
Either of these situations may give rise to secession in eastern Ukraine, but the
first is preferred because it does not require an armed conflict. Ideally, the
entire population of Ukraine would vote in favor of secession in eastern
Ukraine,286 especially since the country is so divided politically, culturally, and
linguistically.287
The basis for secession could potentially be made on the right to selfdetermination.288 Self-determination is the principle that “the rights of peoples
and distinct nationalities to have a State that is representative of their national
aspirations.”289 More specifically, external self-determination would permit

284 Nuremberg Tribunals Prosecutor Ferencz Encourages Students to Think Along Humanitarian Lines,
EMORY U. SCH. L. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://law.emory.edu/news-center/releases/2015/01/nuremberg-tribunalsprosecutor-ben-ferencz.html#.VpR5HcArJcw. Benjamin Ferencz gave a lecture on his life experiences and
thoughts on use of force, law, and international crimes against humanity. This author had the pleasure of
attending the event and was captivated by this quote. Id.
285 Johan van der Vyver, Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under International Law, 10 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (1992).
286 CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE Dec. 8, 2004, art. 73. Ukraine has adopted the notion that any referendum
for secession must be put to a vote by all the people of Ukraine.
287 See supra Parts I.B–C.
288 Photini Pazatzis, Secession and International Law: The European Dimension, in SECESSION:
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 355, 356 (Marcelo Kohen ed., 2006).
289 BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 56.
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people to secede and form their own country.290 The government in the western
part of the country is pro-West and the dissenters in the eastern part of the
country are pro-Russian. Protests inspired the ouster of Ukraine’s rightful
president and the establishment of an illegitimate government, which is now
trying to suppress the reactions in the eastern half of the country. The current
Ukrainian government is not advocating for or representing the interests of the
people from the eastern part of the country, and this denial of the right to selfdetermination could provide the basis for secession. However, it should be
noted that self-determination does not necessarily include a right to unilateral
secession and may have to include a vote of the citizens of western Ukraine.291
As discussed above, a war of national liberation is generally seen as
legitimate because it is closely connected to the right of self-determination.292
Perhaps the United States, along with other NATO members, could
collectively act to help the dissenters in eastern Ukraine, since there could be
an argument for self-determination. While the focus of this Comment is not on
the circumstances that would legally justify secession based on external selfdetermination, secession is potentially one option for Ukraine to end this
conflict. Violence and armed conflict will not produce any long-term winners
in this situation, as they will only create more enemies at an international level
and further alienate the Eastern and Western powers of the world.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the United States and NATO are violating international law
by supplying weapons and aid to Ukraine. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
prohibits the use of force. It provides two exceptions to the use of force: selfdefense and a U.N. Security Council vote. NATO has not secured a valid U.N.
Security Council vote to use force in Ukraine, and it cannot rely on selfdefense because no NATO members have been attacked. Article 5 of the
NATO Treaty also provides no justification for collective self-defense.
Therefore, NATO is violating the general prohibition against the use of force.
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter acts as an additional restraint on NATO
because it expressly forbids states from intervening in the internal affairs of

290 John Dugard & David Raic, The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Secession, in
SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 94, 104–05 (Marcelo Kohen ed., 2006).
291 Id.; van der Vyver, supra note 285, at 11–12.
292 Dugard & Raic, supra note 290.
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other states. NATO is not complying with this Article.293 Nothing from the
U.N. Charter or the NATO Treaty permits the intervention or flow of weapons
into Ukraine. Also, NATO may not rely on Ukraine’s consent because the
current Ukrainian government is illegitimate.294 The current Ukrainian
government is illegitimate because it was established as the result of an ouster,
has not been established by constitutional methods, and does not have effective
control of the territory.295 NATO members are also violating the ICJ’s decision
in Nicaragua by providing weapons to Ukraine’s illegitimate government.
NATO members are trying to build up an illegitimate and illegal government
so it can secure its power and have effective control over the country.
NATO members, led by the United States, are violating international law
and are at the forefront of a potential escalation of violence. The situation in
Ukraine needs fewer guns, not more. International law exists for that very
reason—regulating the relationships between states. One can only hope that
NATO chooses the legal and higher moral ground in combating the ice-cold
tensions of the past in order to help foster a dialogue based on the idea that the
West and the East can have better relations.
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